The Flawed Nuclear Weapons Deal Legitimatizes and Rewards the Iranian Regime

           In my post in May, Obama Legitimatizes the Iranian and Cuban Dictatorships, http://williamcinfici.blogspot.com/2015/06/obama-legitimatizes-iranian-and-cuban.html, in which I commented on the preliminary deal between Iran and all of the Great Powers, including the United States, as well as Germany, to eliminate the Iranian nuclear weapons program, I noted that other critics had pointed out the deal’s numerous flaws.  Now that the details of the Obama Administration’s final agreement have been announced, there are even more concessions to Iran and worse flaws.

            As other critics have analyzed the deal thoroughly, it is necessary to make only a few general observations.  In the first place, it is not only futile, but counterproductive to the interests of the United States to legitimize an untrustworthy dictatorship by engaging in negotiations with it, especially one that is terrorist-sponsoring, such as the Iranian regime.  As I have noted in other posts, such negotiations confer diplomatic legitimacy, which is a propaganda victory for the dictatorship and a loss of morale for political prisoners and other dissidents who are subjected to its tyranny. 

Iran, like other dictatorships that agree to treaties, will certainly cheat on the terms of this nuclear deal, as the Islamic Republic already did on the terms of the preliminary nuclear agreement while negotiating the final one.  The Iranian regime believes it can get away with cheating because either it will not be detected or the consequences of being discovered would be minimal, particularly because of Russia and China’s potential vetoes of the requisite United Nations Security Council resolution to restore economic sanctions.  Even if the sanctions were restored, Iran would benefit not only from their easing, but from the unfreezing of well over $100 billion its assets.  Any trade contracts it would sign in the meantime would nevertheless be honored under the terms of the nuclear deal, even after sanctions might be restored.  Therefore, the net benefits to Iran of cheating are significant, while any price it might pay in terms of a military strike by the U.S. is obviously not credible, either to Iran, or to American allies.  

As this deal with Iran will thereby boost its terrorism-sponsoring capability, it will allow the Islamic Republic to provide more aid its main ally, Bashar Assad’s Baathist regime of Syria, another state-sponsor of terrorism.  Combined with the Obama Administration’s lackluster effort at balancing the need to fight both al-Qaeda and “Islamic State” Islamist terrorists in Syria with the necessity of replacing Assad with an ally in the War on Terrorism, the deal suggests the Administration has given up on any serious effort to overthrow Assad.

            The nuclear deal also rewards Iran for its nuclear weapons program because it allows the ending of economic sanctions unrelated to its nuclear program, specifically those in regard to terrorism and ballistic missile technology, the latter of which can be used to deliver nuclear warheads.  Iran already can reach Europe and is known to be developing even longer-range missiles. 

Therefore, the message the deal sends is that the way for even rogue states to obtain what they want from the United States and the other Great Powers, in terms of diplomatic legitimacy or concessions, is to develop a nuclear weapons program. 

It was obvious also that the Obama Administration wanted a deal with Iran, because it had no stomach for war or it sought the glory of a diplomatic achievement.  The Islamic Republic effectively exploited this tactical weakness to its benefit. 

Conservatives must urge Congress to reject the Obama Administration’s nuclear deal with Iran, as well as to strengthen economic sanctions against the Iranian regime, support more comprehensive and effective policies to roll back Iranian-inspired Islamist revolution, to oppose more rigorously those terrorists sponsored by Iran and its allies, and to support more strongly policies in support of liberty for the Iranian people.  Such policies, coupled with a credible military threat, would better deter the Iranian regime from obtaining a nuclear weapon.