American Interests at Stake in Syria

            

           The civil war in Syria is in the interest of the United States for several reasons.  Although the concerns that any action taken against the regime would be of advantage to the al-Qaeda and other Islamist rebels are legitimate, it is abundantly in American interests to overthrow Bashar Assad’s regime, either by direct action or by supporting more rigorously the non-Islamist rebels, and to replace it with one that, unlike the current regime, respects the liberty of its people, is not allied with Iran and does not support terrorism.  At the least, it is in American interest to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons and to deter their further use. 

            As is typical in any civil war, there are international concerns in regard to Syria that cannot be ignored.  There has been spillover of fighting into Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Israel, some of which are unstable states.  The spillover could possibly trigger a wider conflagration.  Also, the problem of Syrian refugees is particularly acute.  The millions of Syrian refugees in Jordan, for example, risk destabilizing that U.S. ally.  

The argument being advanced by opponents of intervention in Syria is that the Americans and their allies have no interest in Syria because they should not want the Islamist rebels to win.  This argument is contradictory, as it is not an expression of a lack of U.S. interest in Syria, but the acknowledgement of a U.S. interest in Syria: that the rebels should not win, or in other words, that there are competing American interests in Syria.  It is certainly in the interest of the U.S. that the jihadists lose, or at least not win.  It is reasonable for Americans to want their two enemies to fight each other, but a policy based upon such a desire would leave the outcome of the war to chance, let alone fail to enforce chemical weapons agreements or to protect civilians and resolve the refugee crisis.  The U.S. should continue to identify the non-Islamist Syria rebels and support them more rigorously, which would be the only alternative option to direct military intervention that would achieve all U.S. policy goals.  A related international concern is the possibility of Syria’s chemical weapons falling into the hands of these forces, if it has not already happened.

The U.S. is a party to international agreements that prohibit the possession or use of chemical weapons.  It gave up its chemical weapons in reliance of their enforcement.  It is in American interests to enforce these prohibitions.  Otherwise, the message that would be sent to Syria by inaction is that the Assad regime could continue to use chemical weapons with impunity, which would encourage others to seek possession of and even use weapons of mass destruction.  It would especially send a signal to Syria’s main regional ally, Iran, that the Islamic Republic could continue its nuclear weapons program without fear of any significant consequences.  Furthermore, the Assad regime’s indiscriminate mass killing of civilians by both chemical and conventional means is unacceptable and morally obligates the U.S. and its allies to stop it.  Stopping mass killings of civilians by conventional arms was the justification alone for the intervention by the Americans and its allies in Libya, which posed less of an immediate strategic threat to American interests than Syria. 

Syria is the main ally of Iran, the mortal enemy of the U.S.  Depriving Iran of its ally would be a strategic loss for Iran and reduce the Iranian menace to the region and world.

Both on its own and as a conduit for Iran, Syria is one of the worst state sponsors of terrorism in the world.  Syria both harbors and finances terrorists and other jihadists who have targeted and killed Americans.  The 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut by Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi’ite terrorist organization, killed 241 Americans, for example.  Through Hezbollah, among other means, Syria interferes heavily with Lebanese politics.  Hezbollah also threatens or attacks Israelis and Jews around the world, even as far as in Argentina, where it has killed scores of Jews in terrorist attacks.  There have been concerns about infiltrations of the U.S.-Mexican border by the Lebanese Shi’ite terrorist organization, which is allowed to bank in Venezuela, which supports Iran and Syria.  Hezbollah is thus a global terrorist organization, one that had the most American blood on its hands before September 11.  In addition, Syria openly harbors Palestinian terrorist organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which are also backed by Iran. 

Lack of confidence in the Commander in Chief is a valid concern in regard to military intervention.  President Barack Obama’s strategy is uncertain and might possibly not be as effective as intended, but lack of confidence is not sufficient justification to oppose any action.  Instead, it is a reason to support an effective strategy.  The credibility of the President and of the United States are at stake, but this concern is only significant because of the overall strategic interests at stake in the Syrian situation.  The concern about casualties in an intervention is exaggerated.  Several weeks each of bombardment of neither Kosovo nor Libya resulted in any American casualties.  The concern about the cost is valid, bust must be weighed against the economic price of inaction because of the continuation of economic sanctions, the cost of meeting the humanitarian needs of the refugees and the spike in the price of oil.

Syria’s sponsorship of terrorism alone is sufficient justification for war, or at least to overthrow the Assad regime by helping the non-Islamist rebels.  The need to punish Syrian use of weapons of mass destruction only adds to the urgency to confront this despotic regime.  American interests would be greatly advanced by a peaceful non-Islamist representative government in Damascus that would be an ally instead of an enemy in the War on Terrorism.