The latest revelation from the New York Times investigative reports on
the finding by American and coalition forces of numerous dangerous chemical
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) for several years after the 2003 Liberation
of Iraq is that the United
States secretly purchased hundreds of
artillery shells with chemical warheads from an Iraqi source.
The Times, the liberal newspaper of record,
reports the U.S. bought over 400 WMDs in the form of artillery shells, many of
which contained warheads with the nerve gas, sarin, some of which were much more
lethal than expected, between 2005 and 2006.
American forces had previously discovered chemical WMDs in buried caches
and in improvised explosive devices assembled by insurgents, as had been
reported at the time, was revealed to have amounted to 500 weapons by the U.S.
in 2006, was referred to in federal documents leaked in 2010 and was detailed in
a series of reports from October to December of last year by the Times to be an even larger number, and that
both American and Iraqi forces had suffered wounds from exposure to the WMDs
that had remained more dangerous than claimed by the WMD truth-deniers, who
insisted that the WMDs were “too degraded” to pose any threat.
All of these WMDs had been
manufactured by Iraq
prior to 1991. Some of the Iraqi WMDs
found, as well as all those that were purchased, were among those known about
by United Nations inspectors, in part through inconsistent Iraqi declarations. However, unlike some of the other Iraqi WMDs,
the inspectors did not know the precise number of these specific rocket shells
with chemical warheads still in existence, which appears to have been larger
than believed, because Iraq did not fully disclose how many it possessed, which
validates the finding of the Deulfer Report that Iraq was in some ways “more
dangerous” than believed. The WMD
truth-deniers selectively ignored that part of the report, and focused on the
lack of an official announcement of the finding of large stockpiles of WMDs at
the time. The Baathist regime of Saddam
Hussein lied that it had destroyed its WMDs and failed to provide any such
proof of their destruction.
Iraq’s failure to fulfill its
obligation under its 1991 ceasefire after the Liberation of Kuwait, as well as
UN resolutions, was why the UN Security Council found Iraq in “material breach”
of those resolutions, subject to “serious consequences,” which were understood
to mean military action. In addition to
the Baathist regime’s violation of its ceasefire by firing on Coalition
aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones over Kurdish and Shi’ite parts of Iraq, and Iraqi sponsorship of terrorism,
including harboring and financing terrorists who had targeted and killed
Americans, Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction were a justification for war. Indeed, Iraq, which had committed serial
aggression under Hussein, intimidated its neighbors, both with its remaining
conventional force, and its retention of WMD.
The Baathist regime was also found to possess missiles of longer range
than permitted by UN resolutions. Iraq was
violating the UN embargo in the hope of outlasting it to resume its WMD
program.
The program to acquire the 400
Iraqi chemical WMDs succeeded in removing the weapons from the black market and
potentially from the hands of terrorists or other insurgents. It makes sense, therefore, that the results
of the program were not announced at the time, despite the public criticism of
President George W. Bush and other American an international leaders who
supported the Liberation of Iraq for the supposed lack of finding of WMDs.
The lack of credibility in Hussein
and the absence of any proof provided by him that he had destroyed his known
WMDs or even disclosed his full arsenal, made criticism by the WMD
truth-deniers, even at the time, invalid, especially after both media and
government reports of finding of WMDs in Iraq. The series of Times reports now demonstrate clearly, as if any further proof were
necessary, how wrong the WMD truth-deniers were in believing Hussein and
insisting that Iraq no longer had any WMDs, that the WMDs it had were few or
were not lethal (at least in 2003), and thus Iraq was not a threat and war was
not justified, leaving aside Iraq’s other aforementioned acts of war that were
alone sufficient even without Iraqi possession of any WMD. The critics’ argument that the only
justifiable cause of war would have been new WMDs because of the insignificance
of the old WMDs has been thoroughly refuted by reference to Bush Administration
specific citations of Iraq’s
old WMDs as a justification, as well as in terms of the amount and lethality of
Iraq’s
WMD arsenal.
The report even diminishes the one criticism
of the Bush Administration that might reasonably have been made about Iraqi
WMDs: that the Bush Administration’s efforts to destroy Iraqi WMDs had not been
effective. At least in regard to this
particular stockpile of Iraqi WMDs, the program did achieve some success.