The Myth About the Three Fifths Rule
In my last post, I mentioned that the Three Fifths Rule in the Constitution of the United States (Article I, Section 2 Clause 3) is often misunderstood to be some sort of racist or, at least pro-slavery provision, when it is the opposite.
The same clause of the Constitution requires a census to be taken every ten years in order to determine the population, for the purposes of apportioning seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Every state is represented by a minimum of one representative. The larger a state's population, the more representatives it has in the House.
The Three Fifths Rule required that a slave be counted as three-fifths of a person for purposes of the census. Free blacks were counted the same as every other freeman, which proves that the rule was not racial. Slaves were counted as three-fifths of persons in order to reduce the census total for slave states, which thereby reduced the number of representatives apportioned to slave states. An important related constitutional provision (Article 1 Section 9 Clause 1) allowed Congress to prohibit the slave trade by 1808 -- within 25 years after the Constitution was written.
Because slave states had fewer representatives in the House than they otherwise would have had if the Three Fifths Rule had not been part of the Constitution upon its ratification, the power of the slave states in the U.S. House of Representatives was reduced significantly -- a reduction that minimized the spread of slavery, which eventually enabled the abolition of that institution.
The Myth that Washington Warned Against "Entangling Alliances"
The other big myth about the Founding Fathers of the United States is that George Washington warned in his Farewell Address in 1797 against "entangling alliances," as if he were opposed to all alliances, which by their nature are entangling. Although he did express concern about entangling, he did not warn against "entangling alliances."
Washington warned against "permanent alliances." He made an exception for the alliance that the United States already had at the time (i.e. with France). The exception proves that Washington was not against all alliances, but the more important point is that he was not opposed to temporary alliances, even though they are entangling.
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2 comments:
How would Washington view NATO?
JS, thank you for your question, which is an excellent one that I have also thought of from time to time.
Although any alliance is is considered permanent, treaties usually include an opt-out provision. In other words, even "permanent" alliances are only temporary; they last only as long as the parties want it continue.
The purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty was for a specific situation (the threat of Soviet invasion). The Soviet threat turned out to be temporary, but was considered permanent at the time the treaty was proposed as part of the Containment policy. Regardless, the treaty might have been viewed by Washington at the time of its ratification as necessary for the forseeable future.
A more speculative question is whether Washington would continue view NATO as necessary today. Given that Russia is still a communist dictatorship hostile to NATO, even though the Warsaw Pact is defunct and some of its members have even joined the North Atlantic Alliance, it could be argued reasonably that NATO remains necessary to deter Russian aggression, which is certainly how it is viewed in Eastern Europe. Changing circumstances, such as the current reemerging threat of Islamic aggression, might have led Washington to be favorable to extend an alliance temporarily for those specific reasons, but it is reasonable to consider that he might have been concerned about a treaty outliving its original purpose and being justified for secondary reasons, however legitimate. Therefore, he might have favored renegotiating the treaty to reflect the new situation.
It is important to remember that Washington's caution about permanent alliances reflected early American weakness, as well as the concern that an alliance with any of Europe's oft-warring states would necessarily draw the United States into a conflict not in its best interest, despite the protection it would provide. For example, President Washington resisted both the pro-French Jefferson and the pro-British Hamilton in maintaining a policy of neutrality during the Napoleonic Wars, despite their arguments that it was in the American interest to back one of the sides.
Washington's Farewell Address is attributed to Hamilton, who obviously did not oppose permanent alliances out of an isolationist bias toward neutrality, but because of his consistent support for American interests. Indeed, even though Hamilton was pro-British, the Farewell Address accepts the "permanent" alliance with France as a necessary deterrent against any British attempt to retake its lost colonies. Hamilton's concern was that France would draw the Americans into an unecessary war with its British trading partner or with other European states, but he accepted the necessity of the "permanent" alliance with the French, which, of course, turned out to be temporary.
In the case of existential threats to American independence and liberty posed by mortal enemies like Communists or militant Islamists, it is not difficult to reconcile Washington and Hamilton's admonition against "permanent alliances" with European states in the late 18th Century with a "permanent" alliance to defend the interests of the United States, as long as the "permanent alliance" had the customary opt-out provision they would have preferred be exercized as soon as it were prudent.
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